Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium by Blume, Larry & Meier, Martin
www.ssoar.info
Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium
Blume, Larry; Meier, Martin
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Blume, L., & Meier, M. (2019). Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium. (IHS Working Paper, 4). Wien: Institut für Höhere
Studien (IHS), Wien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62218-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
IHS Working Paper 4
March 2019
Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium
Larry Blume
Martin Meier
Author(s)
Larry Blume, Martin Meier
Editor(s)
Robert M. Kunst
Title
Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium
Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
T +43 1 59991-0
F +43 1 59991-555
www.ihs.ac.at
ZVR: 066207973
License 
„Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium“ by Larry Blume, Martin Meier is not under any 
specific license
All contents are without guarantee. Any liability of the contributors of the IHS from the 
content of this work is excluded.
All IHS Working Papers are available online: 
https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/view/ihs_series/ser=5Fihswps.html
This paper is available for download without charge at: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/4970/
Perfect Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium∗
Larry Blume† Martin Meier‡
March 27, 2019
Abstract
In strategic-form games Selten’s (1975) perfect equilibria are ad-
missible. This is not true for extensive-form perfection. Quasi-perfect
equilibria solves this problem using Selten’s (1975) trembles to introduce
a refinement of Nash equilibrium wherein each player puts infinitesimal
weight on other players’s strategies, but not her own. One might be
sure of oneself, while (infinitesimally) unsure of others. However, also
quasi-perfection itself is not without problems, precisely because it ig-
nores future infinitesimal uncertainties in one’s own play. We introduce
a refinement; perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium, to capture the best of
both concepts. Our idea is to force each player to consider infinitesimal
deviations in her own future play, but to make them so unlikely that
they are infinitely less likely than the combined likelihood of deviations
by all other players. Our refinement uses only strategies that are neither
weakly dominated in the strategic form nor in the agent normal form.
∗The authors are grateful to Klaus Ritzberger and Bill Zame for (many) helpful discus-
sions. We thank Robert Kunst for useful comments.
†Cornell University and Institute for Advanced Studies (Vienna)
‡University of Bath and Institute for Advanced Studies (Vienna)
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21 Introduction
Perfect equilibrium was the first of many refinements based on “trembles”,
that is, perturbations of play, which attempt to cope with the problem of
badly-behaved Nash equilibria. The idea of perfection in strategic-form games1
is to put “infinitesimal weight” on all strategies so as to rule out such patholo-
gies as inadmissable equilibria. Selten (1975) accomplished this for strategic
form games by requiring each played strategy in a Nash equilibrium to be not
just a best response to the equilibrium play of others, but also to a converging
sequence of completely mixed nearby strategy profiles.
The task of defining away badly-behaved equilibria, difficult enough in
strategic-form games, becomes even more so in extensive form games. In
strategic-form games, that is, simultaneous-move games in the normal form,
perfect equilibria are admissible, that is, weakly undominated. This is not
true for extensive-form perfection, that is, perfection in the agent-normal
form. Jean-Francois Mertens (1995, p. 379) made the following charming
observation:
There seems to be a prevalent opinion in the literature that
extensive form perfect equilibria are probably preferable to sequen-
tial equilibria, by avoiding dominated choice. Even, e.g., Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) write (p. 344): ‘Moreover, as Kohlberg and
Mertens (1982 [1986], pp. 4-5) have pointed out, unlike perfect
equilibria, sequential equilibria often have the undesirable property
of using dominated strategies’: four different authors are involved,
who should have known better (I could not believe it myself when
I saw it printed).
In the simple game of Figure 1, the strategy for Player I of handing the move
off to player II is part of an extensive-form (agent-normal form) perfect equilib-
rium, but it is nonetheless weakly dominated by player I’s keeping the move for
herself and then choosing the high-return payoff. In this equilibrium player I is
more certain of player II’s play than she is about her own future play. Mertens
1In memory of Lloyd Shapley
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Figure 1: A perfect equilibrium which is not quasi-perfect.
concludes that van Damme’s (1984) quasi-perfect equilibrium, a refinement
of sequential equilibrium which is also normal-form perfect, may be a better
concept. “. . . , by some irony of terminology, the ‘quasi’ -concept seems
in fact far superior to the original unqualified perfection itself.” (Mertens
(1995), p. 380.)
Quasi-perfect equilibria uses Selten’s (1975) trembles to introduce a
refinement of Nash equilibrium wherein each player puts infinitesimal weight
on other players’s strategies, but not her own. One might be sure of oneself
while (infinitesimally) unsure of others. Despite Mertens approbation, quasi-
perfection is not itself without problems, precisely because it ignores future
infinitesimal uncertainties in one’s own play. Unlike van Damme (1984), we
find the play described in Figure 2 (his Example 3) odd. After all, in world
where mistakes are not completely impossible, why should the player risk to
make a mistake in the future instead of insuring her most preferred payoff
immediately?
A middle ground would be to identify a refinement that requires “per-
fection” in the agent-normal form and yet rules out the behavior described
in Figure 1. We introduce such a refinement here — perfect quasi-perfect
equilibrium (pqpe). Our idea is to force each player to consider infinitesimal
deviations in his/her own future play, but to make them so unlikely that they
are infinitely less likely than the combined likelihood of deviations by all other
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Figure 2: A strange quasi-perfect equilibrium.
players. This idea rules out trembles common to all players, since player 2
must believe that trembles on his own future play are arbitrarily smaller than
are player 1’s trembles, while player 1 must believe just the reverse. That is,
with respect to player 1’s future play, (player 1) must believe these deviations
are infinitely less likely than do the other players in the game.
Perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium will be seen to refine quasi-perfect
equilibrium. However, the converse will not be true; that is, there are quasi-
perfect equilibria that are not perfect quasi-perfect. For example the equilib-
rium highlighted in Figure 2 is quasi-perfect, but not perfect quasi-perfect.
One virtue of this intuitive equilibrium refinement is that pqpe are un-
weakly-dominated in both the agent-normal form and in the strategic form.
As far as we know, this is the only equilibrium concept found so far that has
both of these properties. Quasi-perfect equilibria can be weakly dominated
in the agent-normal form, e.g. the highlighted equilibrium in the game of
Figure 2. On the other hand, extensive-form perfect equilibria may be weakly
dominated in the strategic form, as one can see in Figure 1.
Perfect equilibrium and quasi-perfect equilibrium seem to be very close.
Yet van Damme (1984) points out that neither includes the other. This
distinction is highlighted by the game of Figure 3, in which the set of extensive-
form perfect equilibrium strategy profiles is entirely disjoint from the set of
5quasi-perfect strategy profiles. No strategy profile which is extensive-form
perfect can be quasi-perfect, and vice versa. Thus, pqpe cannot refine perfect
equilibrium. In fact, there cannot be a common refinement of both perfect
and quasi-perfect equilibrium.2
2 Definitions
We use the notation of Blume and Zame (1994) except that we refer through-
out to individuals as i ∈ I, the set of choices at information set h is denoted
Ch and the set of local strategies at h we denote by Bh. We will make use of
the agent-normal form, where agents are labeled by the information sets they
control; agent h chooses at information set h for player i , such that h ∈ Hi .
Her strategies are probability distributions over the choices in Ch, that is, el-
ements of Bh. By i(h) we denote the player to which agent h belongs, that
is h ∈ Hi(h). In addition, we use the following additional notation:
• We use b’s for behavior and local strategies. We let Bi denote the
set of player i ’s behavior strategies and B =
∏
i∈I Bi ; Bi =
∏
h∈Hi Bh;
bi = (bh)h∈Hi
• i : a transitive and reflexive relation on Hi , for all i ∈ I, such that
h i h′ iff h, h′ ∈ Hi and h comes after some node in h′ in the game
tree, that is, if there is a path from the root to h that crosses h′.
• We write h i h′ iff h i h′ and h 6= h′.
• We define S(h) = {h′ ∈ Hi(h)|h′ i(h) h} and call it the set of successors
of h.
• We define W (h) = {h′ ∈ Hi(h)|h′ i(h) h} and call it the set of weak
successors of h. Thus S(h) ∪ {h} = W (h).
2Another example can be found in Mertens (1995).
63 Existence of PQPE
3.1 Trembles
The definition of pqpe requires an elaboration of trembles that allow for two
different players to disagree on the trembles assigned to each others’ equi-
librium choices. A strategy profile b = (bh)h∈H = (bi)i∈I together with
the fixed probabilities for the moves of nature induces a probability distri-
bution p(b) over terminal nodes. For each player, Ui(b) = Expp(b)[ui ] =∑
z∈Z ui(z)p(b)(z) is the expected utility if the behavior strategy profile b is
played. Let Z(h) denote the set of terminal nodes that follow information set
h ∈ Hi . If p(b)(Z(h)) > 0, then the expected continuation payoff for player
i from h on if the profile b is played is
Uih(b) =
∑
z∈Z(h)
ui(z)
p(b)(z)
p(b)(Z(h))
.
Note that in this case, perfect recall implies that the conditional distribution
p(b)(z)/p(b)(Z(h)) for z ∈ Z(h) does not depend on (bhˆ)hˆ∈Hi\W (h), as long
as bi does not avoid h (which would imply p(b)(Z(h)) = 0).
Definition 1. A perturbation is a function η : C →]0, 1[ such that
ηh :=
∑
c∈Ch
η(c) < 1.
Here, we let C :=
⋃
h∈H Ch.
Notation 1. Let bh ∈ Bh and η be a perturbation. Denote by bhη the following
distribution:
bhη(c) := (1− ηh)bh(c) + η(c), for c ∈ Ch.
Definition 2. Let η and ξ be two perturbations. The mixed strategy profile(
bh
)
h∈H is an (η, ξ)-perfect equilibrium of the agent normal form, if for each
h ∈ H, we have that bh is a best reply to
(
(bh
′
η )h′∈H−i(h), (b
h′′
ξ )h′′∈Hi(h)
)
.
7An (η, ξ)-perfect equilibrium is an equilibrium of the agent normal form
such that each agent adds in her mind η-trembles to the strategies of agents
of other players’, while adding trembles of size ξ for agents that belong to
the same player as herself.
Obviously, extensive-form perfect equilibria are precisely those that are
the limit as η → 0 of (η, η)-perfect equilibria.
Lemma 1. For all pairs of perturbations (η, ξ) an (η, ξ)-perfect equilibrium
exists.
To prove this lemma we define an auxiliary game G(η, ξ) for a pair
(η, ξ) of perturbations as follows: The players are the players of the agent
normal form of the given original extensive form game, the pure action set of
agent h is the set Ch of pure choices at the information set h, but with payoffs
constructed from perturbed-strategy beliefs. For pure local strategy profile
(chˆ)hˆ∈H, agent h receives the payoff corresponding to the following behavioral
strategy profile in the original extensive form game: Agents hˆ /∈ Hi(h) play chˆ
with probability 1 − ηhˆ + η(chˆ), and choice ahˆ ∈ Chˆ \ {chˆ} with probability
η(ahˆ). Agents k ∈ Hi(h) play ck with probability 1 − ξk + ξ(ck) and choice
ak ∈ Ck \ {ck} with probability ξ(ak), while agent h herself plays ch with
probability 1.
The expected payoff of agent h in the mixed extension of G(η, ξ) for
mixed strategy profile (σhˆ)hˆ∈H is the same as the expected payoff to agent
h from the following profile of strategies in the agent normal form of the
original game: agents hˆ /∈ Hi(h) play ahˆ ∈ Ahˆ with probability
σhˆη(ahˆ) := (1− ηhˆ)σhˆ(ahˆ) + η(ahˆ), (1)
and agents k ∈ Hi(h) play ak ∈ Ak with probability
σhˆξ (ak) := (1− ξk)σk(ak) + ξ(ak), (2)
while agent h herself plays ah ∈ Ah with probability σh(ah).
In other words, if the profile (bh
′
)h′∈H is played in G(η, ξ), agent h re-
ceives the same payoff as if the behavior profile
(
(bh
′
η )h′∈H−i(h), (b
h′′
ξ )h′′∈Hi(h)\{h}, b
h
)
is played in the original game.
8Proof of Lemma 1. Each G(η, ξ) as defined above is a normal form game
with finitely many players and finitely many actions, and hence has some Nash
equilibrium.
3.2 Quasi-best replies
Given a behavior strategy profile b = (bj)j∈I, some information set h ∈ Hi and
a behavior strategy bˆi of player i , we denote by b/hbˆ
i the behavior strategy
profile, where players different from i play the same as in the profile b, i plays
according to bˆi on information sets h′ ∈ W (h) (that is, from h onwards),
and according to bi on all other of her information sets (that is, sets h” ∈
Hi \W (h)).
Definition 3. Let b be a completely mixed strategy profile and h ∈ Hi . Then,
we call b¯h ∈ Bh a quasi-best reply to b at h, if there are bˆi = (bˆh′)h′∈Hi ∈ Bi ,
with bˆh = b¯h such that Uih(b/hbˆ
i) = maxb˜i∈BiUih(b/hb˜
i).
A useful lemma of van Damme (1984) points out that exactly those local
strategies that put weight only on pure quasi-best replies to a strategy profile
b are themselves quasi-best replies to b.
3.3 Existence of PQPE
Now we begin the discussion of pqpe by introducing several perturbed equi-
librium concepts.
Definition 4. Let η be a perturbation. A behavioral strategy profile b is an
η-quasi-perfect equilibrium if for each h ∈ H, bh is a quasi-best reply to the
perturbed strategy profile bη.
Now we proceed to take limits of perturbations. Fix a perturbation
η. To express the idea that the self-perturbations are infinitesimal relative to
other-pertubations, we first take ξ to 0.
9Definition 5. A perfected η-quasi-perfect equilibrium is a limit as ξ ap-
proaches 0 of (η, ξ)-perfect equilibria. More precisely, b is a perfected η-
quasi-perfect equilibrium if there are a sequence of perturbations ξn → 0 and
a sequence of (η, ξn)-perfect equilibria bn, such that bn → b.
Our existence theorem is based on the following two results, which are
interesting in their own right. The proof of Theorem 2 is in the appendix.
Theorem 1. For every finite extensive form game with perfect recall and every
perturbation η a perfected η-quasi-perfect equilibrium exists.
Proof of Theorem 1. Choose a sequence of perturbations ξn → 0 and for
each n an equilibrium bn of G(η, ξn). Since the strategy profiles of those
games are elements of a fixed compact space, there is a convergent subse-
quence (bnm)m∈N converging, for m →∞ to a strategy profile b. By abuse of
notation, we let (bm)m∈N denote now this subsequence converging to b.
Theorem 2. For every finite extensive form game with perfect recall and
every perturbation η, every perfected η-quasi-perfect equilibrium is an η-quasi-
perfect equilibrium.
Now comes the definition of a pqpe.
Definition 6. A behavior strategy profile b is a perfect quasi-perfect equilib-
rium if there are sequences of perturbations ηn → 0 and perfected ηn-quasi-
perfect equilibria bn, such that bn → b.
Simply put, a perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium is a limit as η ap-
proaches 0 of perfected η-quasi-perfect equilibria. The main existence result
is:
Theorem 3. For every finite extensive form game with perfect recall a perfect
quasi-perfect equilibrium exists.
Proof. Choose a sequence of perturbations ηn → 0 and for each n a perfected
ηn-quasi-perfect equilibrium bn of the game. Since the strategy profiles of
those games are elements of a fixed compact space, there is a convergent
subsequence of (bnm)m∈N converging to a strategy profile b. The existence of
this subsequence proves the theorem.
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4 PQPE Among Its Friends
Recall the following definition from van Damme (1984):
Definition 7. Let  > 0. A completely mixed strategy profile b is an -quasi-
perfect equilibrium if for each h ∈ H, if c ∈ Ch is not a quasi-best response
to b, then bh(c) ≤ .
If b is an η-quasi-perfect equilibrium, then bη is an -quasi-perfect
equilibrium for any  ≥ maxc∈Cη(c). In the other direction, given some -
quasi-perfect equilibrium bˆ, one can find a perturbation η and a strategy
profile b that is an η-quasi-perfect equilibrium such that bη = bˆ, with  ≥
maxc∈Cη(c).
Perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of quasi-perfect equi-
librium.
Theorem 4. For every finite extensive form game with perfect recall, every
pqpe is a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
The converse is not true. In Figure 2, Ll is quasi-perfect but not
perfect quasi-perfect. The only pqpe is Rl .
Proof. Let b be a perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium. By the definition and
by Theorem 2 we have a sequence of ηn-quasi-perfect equilibria bn, which
converge to b, with perturbations ηn that converge to 0. As remarked above,
bn, being an ηn-quasi-perfect equilibrium, implies that bn,ηn is an n-quasi-
perfect equilibrium for any n := maxc∈Cηn(c). As ηn converges to 0, n
converges to 0 as well. As ηn converges to 0, and bn converges to b, it follows
that bn,ηn converges to b. Hence we found a sequence of n-quasi-perfect
equilibria converging to b, for a sequence of n converging to 0. Van Damme’s
(1984) Proposition 2 implies that b is a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
One might hope that pqpe refines other equilibrium concepts as well.
Obviously it is a refinement of sequential equilibrium, since quasi-perfection
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refines sequentiality. One might hope that it refines extensive form perfection
as well. Indeed, generically it does because for generic games, all sequential
equilibria are extensive-form perfect; see Blume and Zame (1994). Strictly
speaking, however, it does not. Figure 3 displays an extensive form game
wherein the sets of quasi-perfect equilibria and extensive form perfect equi-
libria are disjoint. Since every pqpe is a quasi-perfect equilibrium, no pqpe in
this game is extensive form perfect.
I
II
0
I II
1/2 1/2
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
3/2
3/2
0
1
1
Figure 3: A game with disjoint perfect and quasi-perfect equilibrium sets.
In the game of Figure 3, in every extensive-form perfect equilibrium
there is at least one player who plays a strategy that is weakly dominated
in the strategic form! pqpe do not use weakly dominated strategies, so
none of these equilibria are extensive-form perfect. In fact, in the games
of Figures 1 and 2 there has been no refinement of Nash equilibrium in the
extensive form that does the obvious correct thing in both games, that is,
choose Rr in Figure 1 and Rl in Figure 2. Perfect quasi-perfection does just
this. Perfected η-quasi-perfection protects an agent from choosing strategies
weakly dominated because of choices available to her own future agents. The
limit of η-perturbations protects that agent against the perturbations of the
agents of other players. Thus pqpe are un-weakly dominated in the agent-
normal form. Weak domination does not occur in the strategic form because
quasi-perfect equilibria are normal-form perfect, and Theorem 4 states that
pqpe are quasi-perfect. We have the following theorem:
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Theorem 5. Every perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium is in strategies that are
neither weakly dominated in the normal form nor weakly dominated in the
agent normal form.
The aforementioned relationships are summarized in the following ta-
ble:
Plays Strategies Dominated in the:
Strategic Form Agent-Normal Form
Ext. Form Perfect Figure 1 XXX
Quasi-perfect XXX Figure 2
PQP XXX XXX
Finally, we note that, following Blume and Zame (1994), Hillas, Kao and
Schiff (2017), and Pimienta and Shen (2013) have shown that for generic
payoffs in any tree, the sets of quasi-perfect-, perfect-, and sequential equi-
librium strategy profiles are identical. Since pqpe are quasi-perfect, it follows
that for generic payoffs in any tree the set of pqpe strategy profiles is con-
tained in the set of extensive-form perfect profiles.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce a new extensive-form equilibrium refinement, per-
fect quasi-perfect equilibrium. Our purpose in doing this is not to change the
practice of applied game theory, but to provide some additional insight into
the nature of equilibrium refinements. Extensive-for perfect and quasi-perfect
equilibrium each allow for some kind of inadmissibility: in the stratgic form for
extensive perfection and in the agent-normal form for quasi-perfection. Per-
fect quasi-perfection guarantees admissibility in both game representations.
From existing examples one might have conjectured the existence of games
with no quasi-perfect equilibrium admissible in the agent-normal form. The
existence of pqpe shows this not to be the case. The refinement “quasi-
perfect and admissible” is coherent.
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The new idea in perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium is that each player
considers deviations by her future selves to be in a different class, infinitely
less likely, than deviations by other players. This requires a more complicated
treatment of trembles, since how each player thinks about herself and how
others do is different, but it also enriches the range of modeling possibilities.
For instance, we can imagine games in which some players share an identity,
a common understanding of the world, and consequently those in the group
view their groupmates differently than those out of the group, in exactly this
way. Examples include models in which ethnic identification is important, and
games in which groups of players are agents for some larger organization. We
leave the exploration of this idea to future research.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume by contradiction that the statement of the
theorem is wrong for the perfected η-quasi-perfect equilibrium b. Then, there
is an agent h of some player i such that this agent does not play a quasi-best
response to bη, but each later moving agent h
′ ∈ S(h) of player i does play a
quasi-best response. Then, in particular, (bh
′
)h′∈W (h) is not a best reply to bη
for player i from information set h onwards. So, there is a (bˆh
′
)h′∈W (h) such
that
Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H\W (h), (bˆ
h′)h′∈W (h)
)
> Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈W (h)
)
.
Since we have assumed that local strategies of agents of player i that move
after agent h do constitute quasi-best replies to bη, Lemma 2 of van Damme
1984 together with the optimality principle does imply that replacing (bˆh
′
)h′∈S(h)
by (bh
′
)h′∈S(h), while keeping everything else fixed does not decrease the ex-
pected payoff for player i from h onwards:
Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈S(h), bˆh
) ≥ Uih ((bh”η )h”∈H\W (h), (bˆh′)h′∈W (h)) .
This, together with the preceding inequality gives:
Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
> Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈W (h)
)
.
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Since b is a perfected η-quasi-perfect equilibrium, there are sequences
of perturbations (ξn)→ 0 and (η, ξn)-perfect equilibria bn, such that bn → b.
Past actions of player i do not matter for computing Uih as long as
they reach h with positive probability, and so we have as well, for every m ∈ N:
Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H−i , (b
h
ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
> Uih
(
(bh”η )h”∈H−i , (b
h
ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈W (h)
)
.
For any agent h′ ∈ H, bh′n → bh′, which implies
1. bh”n,η → bh”η , for h” ∈ H−i ,
2. bhn,ξm → bhξm , for h ∈ Hi \W (h) and every m ∈ N,
Since (ξn)→ 0, we also have
3. bh
′
n,ξn
→ bh′, for h′ ∈ W (h), and
4. bhn → bh.
Therefore, for any m ∈ N:(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
−→
(
(bh”η )h”∈H−i , (b
h
ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
,
and(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bhn
)
−→
(
(bh”η )h”∈H−i , (b
h
ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′)h′∈S(h), bh
)
.
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Hence, for n large enough, we have
Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
> Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bhn
)
.
Again, since past actions do not matter for computing Uih as long as
they are full support we have
Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
= Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξn
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
and
Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξm
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bhn
)
= Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξn
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bhn
)
.
Therefore, we get
Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξn
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bˆh
)
> Uih
(
(bh”n,η)h”∈H−i , (b
h
n,ξn
)h∈Hi\W (h), (b
h′
n,ξn
)h′∈S(h), bhn
)
.
This contradicts the fact that bn is an (η, ξn)-perfect equilibrium, as agent h
by playing bhn, is not best replying.
Proof of Theorem 5. As remarked in van Damme (1984, p. 9), a quasi-
perfect equilibrium of an extensive form game constitutes a perfect equilibrium
of the corresponding normal form game. As is well-known, perfect equilibria
in a normal form game are in strategies that are not weakly dominated in
that normal form game. Hence Theorem 4 shows that perfect quasi-perfect
equilibria are in strategies that are not weakly dominated in the corresponding
normal form.
Let b be a perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium and h ∈ H. By definition,
there is a sequence of perturbations ηn → 0 and a sequence of perfected
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ηn-quasi-perfect equilibria bn → b. In particular, bhn → bh. Hence there is
some m ∈ N such that for all n ≥ m and for all c ∈ Ch: if bh(c) > 0,
then bhn(c) > 0. Since bm is a perfected ηm-quasi-perfect equilibrium, there is
a sequence of perturbations ξn and a sequence of (ηm, ξn)-perfect equilibria
bm,n → bm. Hence there is a l ∈ N such that for all n ≥ l and for all c ∈ Ch: if
bhm(c) > 0, then b
h
m,n(c) > 0. Therefore, b
h
m is a best reply to the completely
mixed strategy profile
(
(bh
′
ηm
)h′∈H−i(h), (b
h′′
ξl
)h′′∈Hi(h)
)
in the agent normal form.
As the support of bh is contained in the support of bhm, b
h is a best reply to
the same full support strategy profile in the agent normal form. Hence bh is
not weakly dominated in the agent normal form.
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